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ABSTRACT 
Reward-based crowdfunding is an emerging financing channel for entrepreneurs to raise money for their innovative projects. 
How to screen the crowdfunding projects is critical for crowdfunding platform, project founder, and potential backers. This 
study aims to investigate whether backers’ word-of-mouth (WOM) is a valuable input to generate collective intelligence for 
project screening. Specially, we answer three questions. First, is backers’ WOM an effective signal for implementation 
performance of crowdfunding projects? Second, how do the WOM help screen projects during the fund-raising process? Third, 
which kind of comments (positive or negative) is more effective in screening crowdfunding projects? Research hypotheses 
were developed based on theories of collective intelligence and WOM communication. Using a cross section dataset and a 
panel dataset, we get the following findings. First, backers’ negative WOM can effectively predict project implementation 
performance, however positive WOM does not have that prediction power. The prediction power of positive and negative 
WOM differs significantly. One possible reason is that negative WOM does contain more information of project quality. 
Second, project with more accumulative negative WOM tend to attract fewer subsequent backers. However, accumulative 
positive WOM is not helpful for attracting more potential backers. We conclude that negative WOM is useful for project 
screening project, because it is a signal of project quality, and meanwhile it could prevent backers make subsequent 
investments.  
 
Keywords: Reward-based crowdfunding, word-of-mouth, project screening, collective intelligence  
 
INTRODUCTION  
Traditionally the best fund-raising options for start-ups in the seed or early stage are business angel and their family members 
or friends (Tomczak and Brem, 2013). However, only a very small percent of entrepreneurs can actually get funds from angel 
investors (Pope, 2011). Crowdfunding, a novel financing channel based on the Internet and online social network, to somewhat 
extent has filled the gap of traditional business angels (Zheng et al., 2014a). According to the return forms to investors, 
crowdfunding includes diverse models, such as donation-, lending-, equity-, and reward-based crowdfunding (Ahlers et al., 
2015; Belleflamme et al., 2014). This study focuses on reward-based crowdfunding in which backers get product or service 
produced by the founder as rewards for their investments. The report released by Massolution in 2015 stated that reward-based 
crowdfunding is one of the primary crowdfunding models with a growth of 84 percentages in 2014, and that reward-based 
crowdfunding is the largest category in terms of overall number of platforms. . The statistics on Kickstarter, a famous 
reward-based crowdfunding platform in US, show that 100,386 projects have received 2.21 billion dollars from 10,313,215 
backers in the Kickstarter platform by February 17, 2016. 
 
Although crowdfunding has gained rapid growth, it has its own challenges and drawbacks. For instance, some projects show 
higher level of challenges or risk of failure in the implementation process. Mollick (2014) found that complex projects are 
more likely to deliver rewards late, and large-scale crowdfunding projects with high funding targets often experienced delays. 
For the founders, testing products and getting feedback from potential backers is one of their motivations to start a 
crowdfunding project. Thus, how to screen the right projects is critical for platforms, founder, and backers. Collective 
intelligence embedded in the crowds themselves is widely recognized as the power to screen projects. For example, Mollick 
and Nanda (2016) found that the backers in crowdfunding platform and offline experts make similar funding decisions.  
 
Except funding decisions, other input such as electronic comments also contribute to screening the right projects. To facilitate 
backers’ comments, most of crowdfunding platforms build online community for backers to post their comments. Active 
participation could enable backers to enjoy the fun of belonging to a crowdfunding community (Gerber et al., 2012), called 
community benefit (Belleflamme et al., 2014). In addition, studies in marketing and electronic commerce indicate that online 
word-of-mouth (WOM), a signal of product quality, could help consumers make better choices (Wang and Yu, 2015). From 
backers’ WOM, we could derive their ratings of the crowdfunding projects. The research on collective intelligence also found 
that crowds’ rating is a one effective approach to filter ideas (Klein and Garcia (2015). However, the value of backers’ 
electronic WOM gains little attention in crowdfunding filtering. To investigate the role of backers’ WOM in screening projects, 
this study aims to answer three questions: 1) Is backers’ WOM an effective signal for implementation performance of 
crowdfunding projects? 2) How does the WOM help screen projects during the fund-raising process? And 3) Which kind of 
comments (positive or negative) is more effective in screening crowdfunding projects?  
 
To answer these questions, we developed research hypotheses based on research on collective intelligence and WOM 
communication, and conducted an empirical study in Demehour which is a famous crowdfunding platform in China. As 
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positive and negative WOM are typical valences, we ignore the neutral comments. Project implementation performance was 
measured as delivery timeliness (Mollick, 2014) and product quality (Zheng et al., 2014b). Firstly, we conducted a 
cross-section data analysis on logistic regression to see whether backers’ WOM works as a signal of project implement 
performance. Secondly, a fixed-effect regression model was used to analyze the approach in which WOM screens projects in 
the fund-raising step. In both cross-section and panel data analyses, we compared the different roles of positive and negative 
WOM to answer the third question. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we review the relevant literature in crowdfunding. Second, we then develop the 
research hypotheses. Third, we present the research design, data, and results. Finally, we discuss the implications for research 
and practice, and conclude the study.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Crowdfunding was initially coined by Howe (2008) as a kind of crowdsourcing, which refers to utilizing the power of crowd to 
get ideas, feedback, and solutions to solve business problems (Belleflamme et al., 2014). Crowdfunding is defined by 
Belleflamme et al. (2014) as “involving an open call, mostly through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either 
in form of donation or in exchange for the future product or some form of reward to support initiatives for specific purposes”. 
This concept covers several kinds of crowdfunding models including reward-, equity-, donation-, and lending-based 
crowdfunding.  
 
Compared with traditional business angel investment, reward-based crowdfunding has its own characteristics. First, the capital 
raised by crowdfunding is relatively smaller  (Belleflamme et al., 2013). Second, the backers or investors in crowdfunding are 
often active to contribute time and expertise which allow entrepreneurs to extract more value (e.g., comments or constructive 
ideas) in crowdfunding community (Belleflamme et al., 2013; Zheng et al., 2015). Third, crowdfunding often takes the form of 
pre-ordering (i.e., advanced purchase) model although most of the products are not completely developed. The entrepreneurs 
describe the products and list the rewards for the backers who would like to obtain the products before they are released to 
market (Belleflamme et al., 2014). Forth, the backers pay more in the pre-ordering process than the traditional consumers who 
wait and buy the final products in the market (Belleflamme et al., 2014). These characteristics show that backers’ participation, 
especially their constructive ideas, is valuable for founders. However, the role of backers’ electronic WOM in project screening 
does not gain enough attention. 
 
The research on backers’ collective intelligence, fund-raising performance, and project implementation in crowdfunding are 
closely related to this study. The theoretical studies have debuted in academia (e.g., Mollick and Nanda, 2016). The widely 
accepted idea is that collective intelligence in the crowds helps screen the projects. The focus variable of collective behaviour 
is funding decision. However, there is a dearth of studies concerning the other inputs such as electronic WOM.  
 
A variety of studies have shed light on the fund-raising stage for additional insights. For instance, entrepreneur’s social capital 
plays an important role in fund-raising process (e.g., Mollick, 2014; Zheng et al., 2014a). Crowdfunding project difficulty, 
team experience, and project planning were found play important roles in improving project implementation performance 
(Zheng et al., 2014b). The number of an entrepreneur’s fans or friends in online social networks is a significant predictor for 
funding success (Mollick, 2014; Zheng et al., 2014a). Compared to fund-raising process, fewer studies have focused on project 
implementation (Mollick, 2014; Zheng et al., 2014b). We posit that projects screening is prerequisite for funding success and 
product quality. Thus it is critical to explore how to filtering crowdfunding projects. 
 
THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES 
The online community in crowdfunding platform is one kind of consumer community in which backers expresses their feelings, 
provide ideas, and seek information from founder. We focus on two categories of backers’ comments – positive and negative 
WOM - as positive and negative are important attributes values of WOM valence. Most of the studies in WOM have 
investigated the impact of extremely positive or extremely negative WOM (Cheung and Thadani, 2012). Backers’ positive 
WOM in crowdfunding emphasizes or praises the strength of crowdfunding project, whereas their negative WOM highlights or 
criticizes the weakness of the product or service. Except valence, volume (information quantity) also has received much 
attention in WOM research (Cheung and Thadani, 2012). Marketing research found that the number of reviews (volume) is 
significantly associated with product sales (Duan et al., 2008). 
 
Crowdfunding community could be seen as an information or intelligence aggregation tool about project quality (Zwass, 2010). 
By analyzing the information in the community, backers could infer the success possibility of crowdfunding project, and the 
founder could receive useful market information about the product or service. Thus, backers’ electronic WOM is an effective 
signal for the implementation performance of crowdfunding projects. In addition, more volume of information makes WOM 
more credible and powerful (Duan et al., 2008) to predict implementation performance which was measured with complaints 
of product quality and delivery timeliness. Thus, we propose that  
H1a: a project with more positive WOM tends to receive fewer complaints of product quality and delivery timeliness. 
H1b: a project with more negative WOM tends to receive more complaints of product quality and delivery timeliness. 
 
From a co-creation perspective, crowdfunding is one approach for founder to utilize crowd intelligence for beta testing of their 
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products in their early stages (Zwass, 2010). Compared with positive WOM, negative WOM is more useful for crowdfunding 
projects which need negative feedbacks to identify limitation or solutions. Klein and Garcia (2015) also found that crowds are 
better at eliminating bad ideas than identify good ideas, which suggests that crowds’ criticism is one important approach to 
generate collective intelligence. In addition, the backers who have close relationships with the founder are less likely to 
criticize the project, and the strangers may post negative WOM when they found weak points of crowdfunding projects. 
Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010) found that in crowdsourcing solvers with high technical and social marginality may be good at 
solving problems as they have different perspectives and heuristics. As for crowdfunding, the backers who are social distant 
from the founder might provide better feedbacks though they are negative WOM in most cases. Thus, we propose that negative 
WOM contains more information about project quality, which could make better prediction of implementation performance.  
H2: compared with positive comments, negative WOM has more prediction power for the complaints of product quality and 
delivery timeliness. 
 
As the second research question is how the WOM help screen projects, one possible approach is that the negative (positive) 
WOM could impede (motive) subsequent investments during the fund-raising process. Studies on the adoption of WOM have 
shed much light on the effects of WOM on consumers purchase decisions (e.g., Cheung and Thadani, 2012; Wang and Yu, 
2015). For instance, Wang and Yu (2015) found that positive WOM will have a strong positive effect on a consumer’s 
purchasing intention, and negative WOM will have a strong negative effect on intention to purchase. It is proper to identify the 
effects of WOM in dynamic approach by investigating the effects of accumulative WOM on investments in subsequent periods 
(e.g., next day). Based on the prior studies on individual level (Cheung and Thadani, 2012), we could derive the aggregate 
effect of WOM on project level so we hypothesize that:  
 
H3a: a project with more accumulative positive WOM tends to attract more subsequent investments. 
 
H3b: a project with more accumulative negative WOM tends to attract fewer subsequent investments. 
 
Marketing research on WOM communication found that consumers tend to weight negative information more than positive 
information (Cheung and Thadani, 2012). The rule of “bad is stronger than good” works across a broad range of psychological 
phenomena as bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form (Baumeister et al., 2001). Park and Lee (2009) found 
that compared with positive WOM, negative WOM has a stronger effect. In crowdfunding, backers also react more strongly to 
the negative WOM. Thus, we propose that  
H4: compared with positive comments, negative WOM has a stronger effect on subsequent investments. 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND DATA  
We conducted an empirical study on Demohour (www.demohour.com), which is the first popular reward-based crowdfunding 
platform in China.  One of the famous projects in Demohour is animation movie “big fish begonia” which hit the screen in 
2016 and earned 0.55 billion Chinese Yuan (approximately 0.09 billion dollars) at the box office. From 2011 to 2014, 
Demohour operated as an integrated platform covering diverse categories of crowdfunding projects such as arts, technology, 
food, movie, publication, etc. Then, Demehour transformed from an integrated website to a vertical platform which focuses on 
the area of smart hardware.  
 
When posting their projects in Demohour, founders are required to describe their projects and set a list of reward (investment) 
options. All of the backers are allowed to comment on any project that draws their attention. If backers favor one project, they 
can choose one reward option and transfer money to the platform. The crowdfunding model in Demohour works in an 
All-or-Nothing way – pledge will be transferred to the founder if and only if the total amount of money pledged by the backers 
is larger than or equal to the fund-raising goal. If one project failed to reach its goal, all the pledged money will be refunded to 
the backers. If one project is successfully funded, the founders will start their projects and deliver the products or service to the 
backers according to their reward options once the project is completed. If the backers cannot receive the reward on time as 
promised by the founders, or receive defective products, they are free to comment or complain in the crowdfunding 
community.  
 
The dataset used in this study falls into the period in which Demohour operated as an integrated platform. The funding records 
in our dataset started from July 1, 2011 and ended on July 2, 2014. The dataset includes detailed information about project, 
founder, investment, backers’ electronic WOM during the fund-raising step, and backers’ WOM regarding project 
implementation performance. All of backers’ WOMs are in text format. We coded the textual WOM as the following categories 
– positive WOM, negative WOM, delivery late, and defective product. Project performance was measured with delivery late 
and defective product. Two researchers were trained as data coders by following procedures suggested by Maxwell (2008) to 
ensure inter-rater reliability. After the two coders finished the independent coding, the research team met to discuss 
disagreements between the two coders and chose a mutually agreeable coding mechanism (Qu et al., 2008). We excluded the 
projects which did not complete the fund-raising step. At last, the resulting sample included 845 projects among which 396 
projects failed to reach the fund-raising goal. Table 1 presents the summarized statistics for all projects. Except binary variable 
and title length, all the other variables were log transformed as they are highly skewed. 
 
 
Page 193
Zheng,Qi,Luo,Liu&Li 
The Sixteenth International Conference on Electronic Business, Xiamen, December 4-8, 2016 
 
Table1. Descriptive statistics of sample projects 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
goal (Yuan RMB) 822 17616.06 62421.13 200 1208130 
pledge (Yuan RM) 845 26743.22 115331 17 1709502 
fund_ratio 845 4.307503 59.36567 0 1709.5 
positive WOM 845 43.71243 127.4155 0 2063 
negative WOM 845 1.957396 5.563769 0 86 
delivery late 845 0.247337 1.614253 0 38 
defective product 845 0.697041 2.904165 0 34 
reward categories 845 7.363314 3.805936 1 35 
project description length 845 1772.075 1114.722 128 13589 
reward options 845 7.363314 3.805936 1 35 
project title length 845 19.35621 6.677381 1 38 
  percentage    
funding success      
fail 396 46.86    
success 449 53.14    
colon      
No 800 94.79    
Yes  44 5.21    
 
METHOD AND RESULTS  
Empirical model 
To answer the first question, we built a logistic regression model as follows to test whether WOM works as an effective signal 
for implementation performance.  
 (1)The dependent variable  refers to whether or not one project gets a complain of delivery timeliness and/or product quality.  
and  are the key variables, i.e., number of positive and negative WOM. Mollick (2014) found that product delivery would be 
more likely to delays if one project is excessively overfunded. So,  the ratio of pledge over goal was included in model 1. At 
last, we posited that fund-raising goal and description length are proxy variables of project complexity which may lead to 
failure of project implementation. So, we included fund-raising goal  and project description length .  
 
To approach the second question – how the negative (positive) WOM impede (motive) subsequent investment during the 
fund-raising process, we developed regression equation 2.  
 
(2)The dependent variable  in model 2 is the number of backers who pledged in project i on day t.  refers to the accumulative 
numbers of backers who pledged in project i before day t.  are the time varying attributes of project i. Except 
PastPositiveWOMi,t-1 and PastNegativeWOMi,t-1, other time varying attributes come from Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2013). We 
also included time invariant variables  such as goal, reward categories, and project description length and title length. The 
error term is decomposed as time invariant part  and time varying part . The key variables used in this study were summarized 
in Table 2. 
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Table 2 key variables in empirical model 
Category Variable  Brief description 
 BackersAddedit Number of backers who pledge in project I on day t 
 PastBackers i,t-1 The numbers of backers of project i before day t 
PastBackers Relativei,t-1 the ratio of the cumulative number of backers bakcing project i before day t to 
the total number of backers required to reach project i’s goal 
Time varying 
attributes  
PastPositiveWOMi,t-1 The cumulative number of positive word of mouths for project i before day t 
PastNegativeWOMi,t-1 The cumulative number of negative word of mouths for project i before day t 
PosFundedi,t-1 1 if the project i is fully funded before day t and 0 otherwise  
DayofWeekit Day in the week, 1 is Monday, 2 is Tuesday, …, and 7 is Sunday 
FundingTimei,t-1 Ratio of the cumulative number of days that have elapsed for project i up to 
day t to the length of project i’s funding cycle in days 
FirstWeek 1 if project i is in the first week of its funding cycle on day t (0 otherwise) 
LastWeek 1 if project i is in the final week of its funding cycle on day t (0 otherwise) 
PastProjectUpdatesi,t-1 The cumulative number of project updates for project i before day t 
Time invariant 
variables  
Goali Fund-raising goal (Yuan RMB) 
Duration i Fund-raising duration (Day) 
TitleLengthi The number of words in the title 
Coloni 1 if the title of a project has a colon, 0 otherwise 
DescriptionLengthi The number of words in the project description  
RewardOptionsi The number of reward categories 
FundRatioi The ratio of total pledge over goal 
Complaini 1 if backers complain about delivery or product quality, and 0 otherwise 
DeliveryLatei 1 if backers complain about delivery, and 0 otherwise 
DefectiveProducti if backers complain about product quality, and 0 otherwise 
 
Hypotheses testing 
Based on the dataset of projects which were successfully funded, we ran model 1 three times with binary variables: Complaini, 
DeliveryLatei, and DefectiveProducti. The results are listed in Table 3. We found that positive WOM does not significantly 
predict implementation regardless of whether one project receives at least one complaint about delivery timeliness or product 
quality. Thus, H1a is not supported. The results indicate that project with more negative WOM would be more likely to receive 
complains of implementation performance, suggesting that H1b is supported. To test hypotheses 2, we compared the 
absolute values of the coefficients by conducting Wald Tests. The result shows a significantly different effects between positive 
and negative WOM (chi square (1) = 22.1, p<0.001). So H2 is supported - compared with positive comments, negative WOM 
has more prediction power for implementation performance. As for the control variable, we found projects with high fund ratio 
and fund-raising goal would be more likely to receive complains on implementation performance. To check the robust of the 
findings, we ran ordinary least square models with complains number as dependent variables. The results of OLS confirmed 
the findings of logistic regressions.  
 
Table 3 logistic regression result 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Complain DeliveryLate DefectiveProduct 
LN_PWOM 0.0419 0.0647 -0.00682 
 (0.37) (0.49) (-0.06) 
LN _NWOM 0.911*** 0.487** 0.850*** 
 (5.43) (2.80) (4.96) 
LN _fund_ratio 0.563** 0.720*** 0.709*** 
 (2.86) (3.56) (3.52) 
LN _goal 0.198 0.244 0.241* 
 (1.80) (1.88) (2.03) 
LN _project_description_len 0.141 0.0990 0.291 
 (0.71) (0.44) (1.37) 
Constant -5.293** -6.088** -7.083*** 
 (-3.15) (-3.14) (-3.89) 
N 449 449 449 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Based on a Hausman type test (Allison 2005), the fixed-effects model is preferred for our dataset. In addition to fixed effects 
regression, we also ran an OLS regression using the pool data as a comparison. To check the robust, we replaced PastBackers 
with PastBackersrelative and ran another fixed effects regression (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013). All the results of panel data 
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analysis are listed in Table 4. Because OLS regression cannot exclude the confusing effects of unobserved project 
heterogeneity, the results of OLS about positive and negative WOM cannot answer the second question. Thus, we turn to fixed 
effects regression which could remove any unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity across projects. The results indicate that 
accumulative positive WOM does not help attract more subsequent backers. So H3a is not supported. However, negative 
WOM will prevent subsequent backers from making investments. Thus, H3b is supported. To test the different effects, we 
found that negative WOM has a stronger effect on subsequent investments (F(1, 817) =8.9, p<0.01). Thus, H4 is supported. 
Additionally, we also found the diffusion of responsibility effects – the negative effects of accumulative backers (Kuppuswamy 
and Bayus, 2013). Control variables in the first week and last week also have significant effects on subsequent investment, 
which could lead to a bathtub shaped pattern of backer support over the funding cycle (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013). Finally, 
we found that on weekends backers are less likely to make investments.  
Table 4 results of panel data analysis 
 (1) – OLS regression (2) – fixed effects regression  (3) - fixed effects regression 
 LN_backersaddedit LN_backersaddedit LN_backersaddedit 
LN_pastpositivewomit1 0.0360*** -0.00233 -0.0313 
 (8.42) (-0.12) (-1.53) 
LN_pastnegativewomit1 0.0744*** -0.127** -0.0947* 
 (9.46) (-3.01) (-2.15) 
LN_PastBackersit1 0.353*** -0.175***  
 (78.59) (-8.40)  
LN_PastBackersrelativeit1   -0.260*** 
   (-3.85) 
firstweek 0.503*** 0.132*** 0.119*** 
 (32.42) (5.35) (4.97) 
lastweek 0.257*** 0.250*** 0.280*** 
 (21.90) (14.05) (16.31) 
postfundedit1 -0.0124 -0.190*** -0.171*** 
 (-1.04) (-4.40) (-3.57) 
LN_fundingtime -0.371*** -0.118*** -0.190*** 
 (-49.76) (-6.16) (-11.83) 
LN_pastprojectupdatesit1 0.00143 0.00197 -0.00480 
 (0.33) (0.08) (-0.18) 
weekDummy1 0.162*** 0.124*** 0.130*** 
 (10.81) (11.68) (12.38) 
weekDummy2 0.210*** 0.153*** 0.161*** 
 (14.10) (13.90) (14.61) 
weekDummy3 0.205*** 0.159*** 0.164*** 
 (13.73) (14.02) (14.41) 
weekDummy4 0.202*** 0.167*** 0.171*** 
 (13.58) (14.53) (14.82) 
weekDummy5 0.170*** 0.142*** 0.145*** 
 (11.44) (12.87) (13.01) 
weekDummy6 0.000705 0.000780 -0.000884 
 (0.05) (0.08) (-0.09) 
LN_goal -0.000807   
 (-0.22)   
Ln_project_description_len -0.0583***   
 (-8.08)   
project_name_len 0.00150*   
 (2.44)   
colon 0.00839   
 (0.47)   
LN_rewardcategories 0.0669***   
 (7.05)   
Constant  -0.973*** 1.047*** 0.579*** 
 (-17.38) (13.63) (11.67) 
N 30695 30695 30695 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we empirically investigated the value of backers’ WOM in screening project in crowdfunding. We obtained two 
interesting findings, as follows. First, backers’ negative WOM can effectively predict project implementation performance, 
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however positive WOM does not have that prediction power. As such, the prediction power of positive and negative WOM 
differs significantly. One possible explanation for this finding is that negative WOM contains more information of project 
quality, as the negative WOM could help the founders find the limitations and improve their products. Second, projects with 
more accumulative negative WOM tend to attract fewer subsequent backers. However, accumulative positive WOM is not 
helpful for attracting more potential backers. In this approach, we could conclude that negative WOM is useful for project 
screening project, because it is a signal of project quality as it could prevent backers from making subsequent investments. 
 
The findings of our study have several theoretical implications. First, we offer a new approach to screening project. Except the 
collective intelligence embedded in backers’ funding behaviors (Mollick and Nanda, 2016), their WOMs are also helpful to 
generate wisdom of crowd. In particular, negative WOM includes more valuable information of project quality. This finding 
also confirmed that crowds are good at eliminating bad ideas (Klein and Garcia, 2015). Second, we extend the study on the 
dynamics of crowdfunding backers (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013). Negative WOM was identified as one important factor 
affecting subsequent backers funding decisions. Third, we extend the research on WOM communications in the crowdfunding 
context. We confirmed that backers react more strongly to negative WOM.  
 
The findings also provide substantial implications for practice. First, for crowdfunding platforms to reduce project failure, it is 
necessary to deeply leverage the value of backers’ WOM which is useful for project screening. For instance, instead of just 
presenting textual WOM, platform could try to present the meaning and volume of WOM in a creative way (e.g., words cloud) 
which is easy for backer to understand. Second, as the negative WOM is closely related to implementation performance, the 
founder should pay more attention to negative WOM and find solutions to address backers’ criticisms. Finally, for backers it is 
always an effective way to screen project by ignoring the project which has too much negative WOM.  
 
There are several limitations in this study. First, we did not study the effect of WOM content which may be also influential for 
others’ decisions (Wang and Yu, 2015). Second, as we could not obtain the project categories information, future research 
could test our findings by including project categories in the model.  
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